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Financial statements1 have long been considered the "lan-
guage of business."' These statements provide a historical record
of a company's economic performance and, as such, play a cru-
cial role in the efficient operation of the capital markets.3 Recog-
nizing this important function, federal securities law authorizes
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to require that
* Associate, Clary, Nantz, Wood, Hoffius, Rankin & Cooper, Grand Rapids, Mich.
Contributing Editor, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. (1987); B.A., Calvin College, 1978; M.B.A.,
University of Michigan, 1980; J.D., University of Michigan, 1987.
1. "Financial reporting consists, in the first instance, of financial statements, i.e., the
balance sheet, the income statement, the statement of changes in shareholders' equity
• .. and the statement of changes in financial position." Stanger & Gunther, 'Big
GAAP-Little GAAP': Should There Be Different Financial Reporting for Small Busi-
ness?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1209, 1210 (1981) (citing BASIC CONCEPTS AND ACCouNTING PRIN-
CIPLES UNDERLYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, Statement of Ac-
counting Principles Board No. 4, T 191 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1970));
REPORTING CHANGES IN FINANCIAL POSITION, Opinion of Accounting Principles Board No.
19 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1971)).
2. See, e.g., Karmel, A Delicate Assignment: The Regulation of Accountants by the
SEC, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 959, 960 (1981).
3. See SEC and Corporate Audits: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House of Representatives Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 181, 188 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB)) ("Accounting standards are essential to the efficient
functioning of the economy because decisions about the allocation of resources rely heav-
ily on credible, concise, and understandable financial information."); Stevens, Who Will
Audit the Auditors?, AcRoss THE BOARD, Sept. 1985, at 57, 58; Wood, Statements in
Quotes: What Must Be Done: A Report from the POB, J. ACCT., Aug. 1985, at 42 [herein-
after POB Report] (Arthur M. Wood, Chairman of the Public Oversight Board (POB) of
the SEC practice section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms, stating that the job of
"assuring the integrity of the financial information on which our capitalistic society de-
pends" has historically been the "unique function" of the accounting profession); see
also Hearings, supra, at 402 (testimony of Frederick D. Wolf, Director, Accounting and
Financial Management Division, General Accounting Office, discussing the overall role of
accounting and the auditing profession in this country); Karmel, supra note 2, at 977
(discussing accountants' role in enabling investors "to place capital where it is most
needed and will be most efficiently utilized"); Note, Failure to Maintain Independence:
A Proposed Cause of Action Against Accountants, 62 TEx. L. REV. 923, 924 n.8 (1984)
("If the public were to lose faith in the accounting profession's 'independent attestor'
function, the usefulness of financial data upon which investment decisions are based
would decline, thus impeding the flow of capital.").
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financial statements of public companies be audited by certified
public accounting firms." The audit ensures that the statements
are prepared according to Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples (GAAP), the profession's standards for proper accounting
treatment.' If a company's statements meet these standards, the
auditor is free to render an unqualified opinion. Because any-
4. Hearings, supra note 3, at 459 n.8 (statement of John S.R. Shad, Chairman of the
SEC); see id. at 455-66 (discussing more fully the SEC's statutory authority and
rulemaking powers); see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 808 n.1
(1984) (citing the statutes that indicate Arthur Young's responsibility for reviewing the
financial statements of one of its clients).
For definitional purposes:
An audit is the process whereby an accountant examines the financial state-
ments of an enterprise and expresses an opinion regarding the accuracy of the
statements and their conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
Accountants who examine and report on such statements are called "indepen-
dent auditors" because of their duty to act with integrity and objectivity.
Note, supra note 3, at 923.
5.
The term GAAP is basically self-defining. It originally was used to describe
those conventions that had received general acceptance and "substantial author-
itative support" throughout the accounting profession. Today, it also encom-
passes those pronouncements of standards that have been issued over the years
by the various rulemaking bodies of the profession.
Stanger & Gunther, supra note 1, at 1209 n.1 (citation omitted); see also Arthur Young
& Co., 465 U.S. at 811 n.6 (indicating that "17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d) (1983) requires that
the financial statements of a public corporation must be audited by an accountant 'in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards' "); Hearings, supra note 3, at 210
(statement of the FASB, noting SEC acceptance of FASB pronouncements on GAAP as
authoritative); CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 1, § 110 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972) [herein-
after SAS 1] (affirming the auditor's professional responsibility to conduct the audit in
accordance with generally accepted accounting standards).
Other organizations involved in setting standards for the accounting profession include
the Public Oversight Board, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(through its Auditing Standards Board, an Accounting Standards Executive Committee,
an Ethics Committee, and its SEC Practice Section), the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board, the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy, the 54 state
licensing authorities, the International Federation of Accountants, and the International
Accounting Standards Committee. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 452.
6. See SAS 1, supra note 5, § 150 (articulating the standards for the conduct of the
audit and the content of the audit report).
An unqualified opinion, the most favorable report an auditor may give, repre-
sents the auditor's finding that the company's financial statements fairly present
the financial position of the company, the results of its operations, and the
changes in its financial position for the period under audit, in conformity with
consistently applied generally accepted accounting principles. Alternatively, the
auditor may give a qualified opinion, which states that the financial statements
are fairly presented except for, or subject to, a departure from generally ac-
cepted accounting principles, a change in accounting principles, or a material
uncertainty. An adverse opinion is a reflection of the auditor's determination
that the corporation's financial statements do not fairly present the [company's]
financial position . . . . [A]n adverse opinion is issued when the auditor deter-
mines that the corporation has materially misstated certain items on its financial
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thing other than an unqualified opinion is sure to raise investor
skepticism concerning the reliability of reported information,
audited firms are obviously anxious to obtain this "seal of
approval."
7
The key to investor confidence in auditor opinions is the inde-
pendence of the auditor." It is ironic, then, that the very firm
subject to the audit both selects and compensates the auditor.
Because auditors can be replaced at any time and for virtually
any reason (or for no reason at all), 9 an inherent conflict of in-
statements. Finally, a disclaimer of opinion expresses the auditor's inability to
draw a conclusion as to the accuracy of the corporate financial records. A dis-
claimer of opinion is generally issued when the auditor lacks sufficient informa-
tion about the financial records to issue an overall opinion.
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 818-19 n.13 (citations omitted); see also Hearings,
supra note 3, at 85-86 (providing a typical example of an unqualified opinion); Auditors
Have 4 Choices in Statements, Wall St. J., June 5, 1985, at 6, col. 2.
7. See Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 819 n.14.
Qualified statements also may affect management's personal wealth. It is not unusual
for managers to purchase shares of their company's common stock for individual invest-
ment or to receive stock options as a form of incentive compensation. Because a qualified
opinion tends to have an adverse effect on a security's market price, management has a
very personal and even selfish incentive to avoid anything other than an unqualified
opinion. Chow & Rice, Qualified Audit Opinions and Auditor Switching, 57 Accr. REV.
326, 327 (1982); see also Berton, Number of Qualified Opinions is Increasing, Wall St.
J., June 5, 1985, at 6, col. 1 (indicating that qualified statements can also lower a com-
pany's credit rating, turn away potential investors, involve regulators, and generally cre-
ate difficulties for the firm in raising outside capital).
8.
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending
any employment relationship with the client. The independent public account-
ant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's
creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public
watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total independence
from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 817-18 (1984); see also SEC Rule 2-01(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.2-01(b) (1988) (providing that accountants must be independent in fact and
designating relationships considered to impair that independence); SEC Rule 2-01(c), 17
C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c) (1988) (in evaluating independence, "the Commission will give ap-
propriate consideration to all relevant circumstances"); SAS 1, supra note 5, § 150 (re-
quiring "independence in mental attitude"); CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 55 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988) (stating that independence is a primary charac-
ter trait expected of a public accountant); Note, supra note 3, at 924 ("Thus, the most
important requirement of the accounting profession is that auditors be regarded by the
public as truly independent from the interests of their clients."). See generally Hearings,
supra note 3, at 467-76 (statement of Chairman Shad regarding accountants'
independence).
9. "Registrants may change independent accountants at their discretion." Request
for Comments on "Opinion Shopping," Exchange Act Release No. 22,197, 50 Fed. Reg.
28,219 (1985).
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terest exists.10 The auditor is professionally concerned with ren-
dering a truly independent assessment of the client's accounting
treatment, yet he is also dependent on the client's satisfaction
for continued audit revenue.11 Ultimately, satisfying a client re-
quires rendering an unqualified opinion.
12
A client company may be tempted to exploit this situation.
When a company changes accountants "because of a desire to
obtain the services of an accountant willing to interpret gener-
ally accepted accounting principles. . . in a manner which frus-
trates the reporting of the true economic substance of transac-
tions or events, the [firm] and the new accountant may be
deemed to have participated in 'opinion shopping.' "13 Although
frequently difficult to prove, this is precisely the type of insidi-
ous activity that both the profession and the SEC would like to
prevent.14 A related concern, even more difficult to prove, is the
situation in which the client firm uses the power of its purse to
coerce its auditors to bend the rules to give the client firm an
unqualified opinion, without ever actually changing auditors.1"
10. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 879 (Public Oversight Board Report, Scope of
Services by CPA Firms); see also id. at 561-62 (questioning by Congressman Luken of
Chairman Shad) ("How can we really expect auditors to be independent when they are
hired, fired and paid by the corporate managers?").
11. "A perceived conflict is created between the auditor accepting an accounting
practice which particularly favors its client's reporting objectives and the auditor fulfil-
ling his responsibilities to act as a 'watchdog' for the public." Request for Comments on
"Opinion Shopping," supra note 9, at 28,219; see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 2 (ques-
tion by Rep. John D. Dingell, presiding) ("How can the independent auditor on the job
be expected to maintain independence when his or her personal success is linked to at-
tracting clients and enhancing revenues?").
12. The percentage of qualified opinions that are actually published is extremely low.
It would seem reasonable to assume that, in most cases, the auditor and client continue
to negotiate over the accounting treatment until the auditor is satisfied that she may
fairly render an unqualified opinion. The SEC's policy of refusing to accept anything
other than an unqualified opinion to satisfy the Securities Acts' requirements provides a
significant incentive to reach some accord. See, e.g., Notice of Amendments to Require
Increased Disclosure of Relationships Between Registrants and Their Independent Pub-
lic Accountants, Accounting Series Release No. 165, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,187, at 62,395 (Dec. 20, 1974).
13. Request for Comments on "Opinion Shopping," supra note 9, at 28,219. A dis-
tinction should be made between "auditor shopping" and "opinion shopping." The latter
is the practice of explicitly seeking a more favorable accounting treatment, while the
former may be the entirely legitimate practice of merely seeking more competent or
lower-cost accounting services. When auditor shopping becomes a subterfuge for opinion
shopping, the two terms can easily become confused.
14. See, e.g., Serlin, Auditing Developments, J. AccT., AUDITING & FIN., Fall 1985, at
74, 76 (describing the loss of credibility due to opinion shopping as "perhaps the SEC's
and the profession's greatest concern").
15. "Critics frequently charge that the asymmetry of power between auditors and
managers may seriously weaken the auditor's ability to exercise freely his professional
judgment." Chow & Rice, supra note 7, at 326.
Opinion Shopping Solution
Moreover, there may be situations where the auditor has re-
ceived no such express or even implied threats yet nevertheless
feels pressured to give an unqualified opinion simply because
there are other firms in the profession that will. 6 Actual docu-
mented cases of auditor shopping may be the tip of the iceberg
of a much larger problem.
In short, auditors may be jeopardizing their independence to
maintain and appease the fee-paying client. To the extent that
this occurs, financial statements are less reliable than otherwise,
and statement users are forced to expend additional resources to
obtain the quality information they desire. In the aggregate, this
represents a significant and unnecessary social cost.
This Note argues that the existing regulatory mechanism has
failed to address adequately the problem of opinion shopping,
and that better means of ensuring the reliability of financial
statements are needed. Part I describes the nature and extent of
the opinion-shopping problem, including a discussion of its
larger, macroeconomic impact. Part II argues that the underly-
ing causes of the problem are systemic, and that present safe-
guards against opinion shopping are inadequate. Finally, Part
III examines some alternative solutions and proposes a system of
Accounting Issue Inquiry Centers under the direction and aus-
pices of the SEC. These Centers would be designed to achieve
more effectively the goal of truly independent public audits.
I. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
The initial impetus for this Note arose out of an SEC request
for public comment on the practice of "opinion shopping. ' ' 17 The
Commission proposed various amendments to its disclosure re-
quirements concerning auditor-client disagreements and related
auditor changes." At the same time, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),19 the Accounting Stan-
16. Id. (citing Sterling, Accounting Power, J. Acc., Jan. 1973, at 61, 66).
17. Request for Comments on "Opinion Shopping," supra note 9.
18. Id. (proposing changes in Item 304 of Regulation S-K, Item 9(c) of Schedule 14A,
and Form S-18). Because of its concern that companies and accounting firms were per-
haps being unduly narrow in their conception of "disagreements," the Commission also
considered more direct forms of opinion-shopping disclosure. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 75-76. The Commission has since adopted a variation of these proposed disclos-
ure rules. See infra notes 86-87 & 91-97 and accompanying text.
19. The AICPA is a private organization founded in 1887 with a current membership
of approximately 174,000 certified public accountants. Stanger & Gunther, supra note 1,
at 1209 n.2.
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dards Board, and the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA's Divi-
sion for CPA Firms (SECPS) all began reviewing the problem in
conjunction with other professional and ethical issues.20 As if
this were not enough attention to the problem, the House of
Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce con-
ducted hearings on the SEC and its oversight of corporate au-
dits.21 The accounting profession has not undergone such critical
scrutiny since the 1976 Metcalf Hearings.2 2
A. An Illustrative Example
A hypothetical example illustrates the nature of the prob-
lem.2 3 Suppose that the research and development department
of a publicly held manufacturing concern develops an exciting
new technology with potential for significant product applica-
tion. To exploit this technology, however, the manufacturer will
be required to expend significant corporate funds over the next
several years before receiving any financial payback on the in-
vestment. The manufacturer is concerned that, during the in-
terim, the expenditures will have an adverse impact on the com-
pany's financial statements, reflecting negatively on company
management.
As a solution to this quandary, the company's financial group
proposes that a new subsidiary be created and its stock sold to
third-party investors. The manufacturer would advance funds to
the subsidiary for continued research and development of the
technology and receive notes in return. These notes would be
convertible into stock of the subsidiary at the election of the
parent company. The parent company would also have a domi-
nant position on the subsidiary's board of directors.
20. Request for Comments on "Opinion Shopping," supra note 9, at 28,220 n.8.
21. Hearings, supra note 3.
22. Accounting and Auditing Practices and Procedures: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmen-
tal Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977). The impetus for these hearings was probably
provided by the sensational failure of such companies as Penn Central Corporation and
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, companies that either had or currently were receiving
substantial federal assistance. The increasing involvement by private accounting firms in
public-sector accounting also contributed to congressional interest. See Karmel, supra
note 2, at 963.
23. This example is derived from Serlin, supra note 14, at 74-75; see also Serlin,
Statements in Quotes: "Shopping Around": A Closer Look at Opinion Shopping, J.
AccT., April 1986, at 120 (reprinting an adapted version of the original article).
[VOL. 22:1
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The company's current auditors assert that this arrangement
elevates form over substance and insist that the financial state-
ments of the subsidiary be consolidated with those of the parent
corporation. Undaunted, the parent company solicits the advice
of a second auditing firm, which somewhat surprisingly indicates
its willingness to approve the transaction and separate the ac-
counting treatment of the two entities. Despite the acquiescence
of this second accounting firm, however, the current auditors re-
fuse to reconsider their position. They inform the manufacturer
that failure to comply with their approach will result in a quali-
fied audit opinion, an option totally unacceptable to either the
company's investors or the SEC. The parent company ultimately
concludes that it must replace its existing auditors with the sec-
ond auditing firm to obtain the accounting treatment it deems
necessary. This is a classic case of opinion shopping.
B. The Prevalence of Opinion Shopping
Just how prevalent is this problem? Reliable data are difficult
to obtain because firms can easily mask the true reasons for any
auditor changes that they make.2"' Many-perhaps even
most-auditor changes are entirely legitimate. The firm might
simply want a fresh perspective on its financial controls. There
may be personality conflicts with the firm's existing auditors.2 5
Most commonly, though, the firm simply obtains a lower-cost
bid from a competing accounting firm.2
What motivated the SEC's attention, however, was a survey
conducted by the National Association of Accountants (NAA)
that found a seventy-five percent increase in auditor switching
24. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 714-15 (statement of Arthur W. Bowman, Editor,
Public Accounting Report) ("It's hard to detect whether public companies interview
CPA firms to get the 'right' kind of accounting treatment.").
25. See, e.g., 1985 AUDITOR CHANGES ANNUAL REPORT 4-6 (Public Accounting Report
pub. 1986).
26. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 695 (testimony of Arthur W. Bowman) ("And cli-
ents firing big eight [accounting] firms cite high fees more often than any other rea-
son .... [Companies'] decisions on hiring a new firm are often based on cost alone.");
see also Berton, Auditor Changes by Public Companies Set High as Accountants Com-
pete More, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1985, at 12, col. 3 (citing Public Accounting Report to
the effect that about 70% of companies in 1984 mentioned lower fees and better service
as their reasons for changing auditors). But see Dykes & Hermanson, Business Ex-
change: Price Wars-Public Accounting Under Fire, BUSINESS, Apr.-June 1985, at 50,
51-52 (study showing that, of four dimensions clients considered most important in se-
lecting an auditing firm, proposed fee ranked lowest).
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from 1981 to 1984.27 Of the companies changing accounting
firms during that same three-year period, nineteen percent had
recently received some form of qualified opinion.2 When cou-
pled with the complaints that it continued to receive concerning
the practice,29 and the publicity surrounding some rather suspi-
cious auditor changes, 30 the SEC properly concluded that the
problem deserved further consideration.
Two SEC enforcement actions provided further evidence of a
problem. In April 1985, the Commission conducted an adminis-
trative proceeding against the Broadview Financial Corporation,
alleging that it had improperly overstated its revenue and net
income by approximately four million dollars. 1 Without either
admitting or denying guilt, the company restated the affected
financial reports and agreed to adhere to GAAP in future real
estate transactions.2 It was also discovered, however, that the
company had gone to four Big Eight accounting firms33-besides
its original auditor-before finding an auditing firm that con-
curred with the improper treatment. 4 Although the SEC
threatened to prosecute the company's new auditors for violat-
ing various portions of the federal securities laws, ultimately no
enforcement action was taken."5
27. See Middleton, SEC Targets 'Opinion Shopping,' Nat'l L.J., Sept. 23, 1985, at 9,
col. 1; see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 694 (testimony of Arthur W. Bowman) ("More
public companies changed auditors in 1984 than in any of the 7 years that Public Ac-
counting Report has monitored public auditor changes. The number of companies
switching has risen markedly in the last few years. Seventy-five percent more changed in
1984 than in 1981."); id. at 582 (testimony indicating that nearly 1000 publicly traded
companies changed auditors in the preceding couple of years); Berton, supra note 26, at
12, col. 3 (citing Public Accounting Report for the fact that a record 523 publicly traded
companies changed auditors in 1984).
28. Qualification or disclaimer was never claimed as a reason for changing firms, how-
ever. Hearings, supra note 3, at 695 (testimony of Arthur W. Bowman).
29. See POB Report, supra note 3, at 146.
30. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 585 (citing the example of Chase Manhattan
Corp.'s termination of its auditors only shortly after the improprieties of the Penn
Square and Drysdale Securities audits were revealed).
31. In re Broadview Fin. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 21,949, [1982-1987 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,454, at 63,196 (April 17, 1985).
32. Id. at 63,202-04; see Middleton, supra note 27, at 9, col. 2; Ingersoll, SEC Warns
Accountants, Public Firms Against 'Shopping' for Audit Opinions, Wall St. J., Apr. 18,
1985, at 7, col. 1.
33. In re Broadview, at 63,196. The Big Eight accounting firms are, in decreasing
order based on annual revenues: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; Arthur Andersen & Co.;
Coopers & Lybrand; Ernst & Whinney; Price Waterhouse; Arthur Young & Co.; Deloitte,
Haskins & Sells; and Touche Ross & Co. Berton, Mixed Marriage: Accountants' Merger
Tests Idea of Meshing Partners World-Wide, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
34. In re Broadview, at 63,196; see Middleton, supra note 27, at 9, col. 4; Ingersoll,
supra note 32.
35. Middleton, supra note 27, at 9, col. 4.
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The SEC elected to take more stringent action, however, in In
re Wade.3 6 There, two savings and loan companies had dis-
missed their original auditors in favor of a new auditor who per-
mitted an improper deferral of losses to future years. This time,
the Commission invoked Rule 2(e) to discipline the professionals
involved.3 7 Two of the accounting firm's partners were barred for
three years from any involvement with companies that might file
with the Commission; the third partner involved was completely
prohibited from undertaking any consulting or auditing work
with public companies."8
These examples illustrate two blatant cases of opinion shop-
ping. Other examples can also be cited."9 But the real nature of
the problem may not be limited to those cases where firms actu-
ally switch auditors. A much more pervasive problem is that ac-
countants may be deterred from giving qualified opinions for
fear that a client may switch auditors whenever it feels that
some other firm may give it more favorable treatment.' Even if
those fears are never realized, the subtle pressure may be lead-
ing auditors to render less than completely objective, indepen-
dent opinions."1 In other words, it is possible that the NAA sta-
tistics underestimate the magnitude of the problem.
Three recent developments in the industry heighten the
probability that these fears and pressures might be a significant
problem. First, the profession is becoming increasingly competi-
tive, especially where audit services are involved.42 Management
36. In re Steven 0. Wade, Exchange Act Release No. 21,095, [1982-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,432, at 63,130 (June 25, 1984).
37. In re Wade, at 63,130; Middleton, supra note 27, at 10, col. 1; see also infra note
109 (discussing the SEC's enforcement and remedial powers).
38. In re Wade, at 63,137; Middleton, supra note 27, at 10, col. 1.
39. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 715-16 (examples provided in statement by
Arthur W. Bowman).
40. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
41. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Rep. John D. Dingell, presiding)
("In a world where the self-interested claims of corporate managers cannot be verified by
those outside the corporation, the Nation needs an independent umpire who will ex-
amine those claims and call fair or foul, as the case may be, without any fear of intimi-
dation.") (emphasis added); see also id. at 561 (statement of Clarence Sampson of the
SEC) (" [W]e have to recognize that the payment of fees by the client could be consid-
ered to be a pressure on the accountant with respect to his independence.").
42. See generally POB Chairman Urges Major Changes in Self-Regulatory Program
for Accountants, C.P.A. J., Sept. 1985, at 7 (remark by Arthur M. Wood, Chairman of the
POB, that the practice of opinion shopping is a "by-product of today's intensely compet-
itive economy"); Sack, Commercialism in the Profession: A Threat to be Managed, J.
AccT., Oct. 1985, at 125; Berton, Total War: CPA Firms Diversify, Cut Fees, Steal Cli-
ents in Battle for Business, Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1985, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter Berton,
Total War]; Berton, Audit Fees Fall as CPA Firms Jockey for Bids, Wall St. J., Jan. 28,
1985, at 33, col. 3 [hereinafter Berton, Audit Fees Fall].
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frequently views audits as fungible commodities.4" "Bidding
wars" among auditors are not uncommon."" Mergers and consoli-
dations reduce the number of potential audit clients, contribut-
ing to the sometimes cutthroat competition.45 One need only ob-
serve the dramatic growth in advertising and marketing by
accounting firms to appreciate the increased commercialism of
the profession today.46
43. See Berton, Audit Fees Fall, supra note 42 (quoting a partner at a medium-sized
accounting firm as saying: "Many of our clients are treating the audit as a commodity,
like shopping for cheaper gasoline."); see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 84; Pearlman,
Accounting and Auditing, Committee Commentary on Current Developments, C.P.A. J.,
Oct. 1985, at 85.
Dykes and Hermanson explain this phenomenon as follows: "[S]ome executives may
view accounting firms as essentially identical: the firms are all bound by strict profes-
sional standards and procedures and have highly trained personnel. Therefore, any ac-
counting firm's 'clean' opinion would be acceptable. Using this reasoning, the opinion
that is the least costly would be preferable." Dykes & Hermanson, supra note 26, at 51.
44. Discounts of 30% to 50%-or more--off base fees are apparently no longer un-
usual. Berton, Audit Fees Fall, supra note 42. "Many companies are taking advantage of
the cut-rate environment. Biotech Capital Corp., a small New York-based venture-capi-
tal concern, recently asked four big CPA firms to bid for its audit, which previously had
been done by Arthur Young & Co. for $40,000 to $45,000 a year. Deloitte, Haskins &
Sells won the competition with a $12,500 bid." Id.
Another example is provided by Dykes & Hermanson, supra note 26, at 50:
You are the chief executive officer of a manufacturing company with current
sales of $20 million. You have been requested by your company's creditors to
obtain audits for the current year and for two prior years. After receiving pro-
posals from three different accounting firms, you must choose among bids of
$35,000, $5,000, or zero. What would you do?
Id. To explain why an accounting firm would be willing to bid as low as zero for some
audits, Eli Mason, CPA, Managing Partner, Mason & Co., says that the firms are essen-
tially "purchasing the account for one year's fee." Hearings, supra note 3, at 734; see
also id. at 695, 705-06 (statement by Arthur W. Bowman) (providing examples of cut-
rate bidding).
45. See Berton, supra note 26 ("Mergers accounted for 20% of the [auditor] changes
in 1984, up from 16% in 1983 and only 13% in 1982."). One major accounting firm, for
example, blames mergers for costing it three of its largest clients since 1981. Id.
46. See, e.g., Berton, Total War, supra note 42, at 24, col. 4 (reporting that large
CPA firms "speak with pride of beefed-up marketing efforts for clients of all sizes," and
citing examples of the dramatic expansion in the use of marketing personnel and tech-
niques by various Big Eight accounting firms); see also Pearlman, supra note 43, at 85
(the emphasis on marketing has contributed to the perception that accounting profes-
sionalism is on the decline); Sack, supra note 42, at 126 (referring to "the hype sur-
rounding the public estimation of annual firm revenues"); Seiler, Competition and Inde-
pendence, C.P.A. J., Oct. 1987, at 4, 4 ("The stage has been set for commercialism to
take the place of professionalism.").
A good explanation for this recent emphasis on marketing and aggressive pricing is
provided by Dykes & Hermanson, supra note 26, at 50 (discussing the impact of certain
Supreme Court decisions and subsequent revisions to the AICPA Code of Professional
Ethics).
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The second factor is the dynamic growth of management advi-
sory services (MAS) by large public accounting firms."7 The sig-
nificance of this aspect of the practice is that obtaining new au-
diting clients, and retaining existing ones, is necessary not only
to bring in audit fees, but also-and perhaps even more impor-
tantly-because it can bring in lucrative management consulting
fees.4 8  The pressure to satisfy clients is greater than ever
before."'
Finally, it should be emphasized that even if accountants are,
in fact, resisting these pressures, the SEC and the profession it-
47. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 697. Arthur W. Bowman describes the trend as
follows:
The intense competition for SEC clients has not only driven the price of au-
dits down; it has slowed the dollar growth in the accounting and auditing prac-
tices of the big eight firms. To compensate, the firms have placed new emphasis
on marketing their tax and management consulting abilities, practice areas that
have grown almost twice as fast as auditing and accounting.
Traditionally, accounting and auditing accounted for about 75 percent of the
large firms' revenue. The figure is now dropping. The chairman of the AICPA's
Future Issues Committee, Richard Hickok, predicted 2 years [ago] that the per-
centage would drop to 55 percent....
[B]etween 1982 and 1984, revenue from accounting and auditing for the
big eight firms grew 14 percent from $2.8 billion to $3.2 billion. Tax billings
increased 28 percent from $936 million to $1.2 billion, and revenue from man-
agement consulting jumped 33 percent from $625 million to $830 million.
Id. at 697-98.
48. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 97 (statement of Abraham J. Briloff that "the
ostensibly independent audit has become the loss leader for the lucrative MAS [Manage-
ment Advisory Services] coin"); id. at 28 (statement of Robert Chatov that accounting
firms retain their management advisory services "not because the service is a necessary
adjunct to the accounting function, but because of its lucrative potential"); id. at 144
(statement of Abraham J. Briloff criticizing the "subsidization" of the audit function by
management advisory services); id. at 157 (testimony of Abraham J. Briloff regarding
"lowballing," the practice "whereby audit firms go out competing for audit situations to
buy in the audit, hoping against hope that through their extension into the nonaudit
field they might somehow or other be able to compensate for the losses that they are
prepared to take on the audit function").
Some have expressed the concern that offering consulting services could lead to the
situation where the accountant is asked to audit his own work. See, e.g., Hearings, supra
note 3, at 570-77 (questioning directed to Chairman Shad regarding the Drysdale Securi-
ties audit). Others, conversely, have vigorously contended that management advisory ser-
vices have no adverse effect whatsoever on the independence of the auditor. See, e.g.,
THE COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' REsPONsEIBLITiEs, REPORT, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS (1978) (often referred to as the COHEN COMMISSION REPORT, it is the product of
an independent commission established by the AICPA in 1974 to study the role and
responsibilities of independent accountants). Perhaps the problem is "not so much lack
of independence in fact as the appearance of lack of independence." See Hearings, supra
note 3, at 877.
49. "The increasing diversification of accountant services to clients has created new
stresses on an auditor's ability to remain independent and objective in conducting finan-
cial evaluations." Note, supra note 3, at 944.
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self must continue to concern themselves with the appearance of
independence.5 0 The general view that accounting professional-
ism is on the decline is fairly widespread.5' This public percep-
tion of audits is crucial: when public faith in the independence
of audits erodes, the economic costs to society can be significant.
C. The Societal Costs of Auditor Shopping
As audited firms come to learn that they can successfully pres-
sure their auditors into giving favorable opinions, they are likely
to become increasingly aggressive in their financial reporting.2
This puts pressure on more conservative firms to follow their ex-
ample. The problem snowballs.
Accountants similarly face the "bandwagon" syndrome. To
the extent that some accounting firms are able to compete suc-
cessfully by bending the rules, the pressure increases upon other
firms to follow suit, if only to remain economically competitive.5 3
Ultimately, the capital markets and the general public suffer
the costs of this type of behavior. When faith in the quality and
50. "If the public were even to perceive that opinion shopping is wide-
spread-regardless of whether it achieves the end result sought by those who engage in
such activity-public confidence would be severely damaged." Address by SEC Commis-
sioner James C. Treadway, Jr., 17th Annual Rocky Mountain State-Federal-Provincial
Securities Conference, Denver, Colorado (Oct. 19, 1984), quoted in Serlin, supra note 14,
at 75; see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 2 (comments of Rep. John D. Dingell, presid-
ing); id. at 469 (statement of Chairman Shad, citing SAS 1, supra note 5, § 220: "Inde-
pendent auditors should not only be independent in fact; they should avoid situations
that may lead outsiders to doubt their independence."); Accounting Series Release No.
165, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,187, at 62,395 (Dec. 20,
1974) ("It is essential that both the fact and the appearance of independence be sus-
tained so that the confidence of the investing public in the reliability of audited financial
statements and the integrity of the public accounting profession will be maintained and
enhanced.").
51. "A crisis of confidence and credibility is confronting the accounting profes-
sion. . . . [T]he criticisms of the profession are widespread and harsh." Anderson, A
Fresh Look at Standards of Professional Conduct, J. AccT., Sept. 1985, at 91, 91; see
also Pearlman, supra note 43, at 85 (acknowledging the "growing perception . . . that
professionalism is on the decline" and referring to the "tarnished image" of the
profession).
52. "The mere fact that opinion shopping occurs encourages to some extent a belief
among issuers and disgruntled executives that this form of pressure is an effective, legal,
and acceptable way to bludgeon accountants into submission on disputed accounting is-
sues." Address by James C. Treadway, Jr., supra note 50. In the U.S. economy, where
businesses must "compete for scarce capital on the basis of their financial prospects,
there is a tremendous incentive for them to present the best possible picture in their
financial statements." Hearings, supra note 3, at 389 (statement of Donald J. Kirk,
Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board).
53. Serlin, supra note 14, at 76.
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reliability of financial reporting decreases, the capital markets
become correspondingly more risky. Investors protect them-
selves by discounting the value of equity investments, effectively
discouraging the use of equity financing as a source of capital for
corporate investment. Creditors likewise protect themselves by
charging higher rates of interest to compensate for the increased
risk that they incur. Ultimately, the cost of capital rises, corpo-
rate investment declines, productivity increases at a slower pace
than it otherwise might, and society experiences a lower stan-
dard of living than could otherwise have been achieved. 4
II. BUT Is THERE REALLY A PROBLEM?: THE PROFESSION'S
RESPONSE
The auditing profession raises a variety of defenses whenever
it encounters accusations of opinion shopping. Some members
rationalize the shopping problem as simply being inherent in the
nature of auditing as a profession, especially where auditors
must compete in a free-market economy. Others rest their case
on various structural and protective mechanisms already in
place. This Section examines some of these responses and con-
cludes that, despite all the rhetoric, the fundamental nature of
the problem remains unresolved.
A. The Nature of the Auditing Profession
The most persuasive argument raised by the profession is that
auditing, by its very nature, is judgmental. Accounting standards
leave room for honest differences of professional opinion about
how best to record a given transaction.55 This judgmental, dis-
cretionary element of accounting is an important factor in ex-
54. For discussions of the role of financial disclosure in the capital markets, see R.
MAUTZ & W. MAY, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY (1978) and V.
BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTmN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 1059-1235 (2d
ed. 1979).
55. Serlin, supra note 14, at 78.
Accounting is an art, not an exact science. While that concept perhaps is diffi-
cult for the public to accept, it is for that reason that different auditors, given
the same set of facts, can come to different conclusions regarding the accounting
for a transaction or event .... Given the possibility that there can be more
than one "right" answer, management is entitled to know the differing
viewpoints.
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plaining why it has generally been considered one of the learned
professions. The fact that one auditor would permit more leni-
ent treatment than another auditor is not necessarily a problem.
Nevertheless, most accountants would readily agree that the
choice of accounting treatment has never been left entirely to
the judgment of the particular auditor at hand. Indeed, the rec-
ognition of GAAP is designed to ensure a certain degree of uni-
formity and consistency among accounting treatments.56 Absent
some level of consistency, it becomes very difficult to compare
information across firms or over time.5 7 The information, accord-
ingly, would have considerably less value. Thus, there are limits
to the degree of discretion left to any individual practitioner.
Occasionally, reference will be made to the practice in the
medical field.58 Just as medical patients are encouraged to seek a
second opinion, why not permit a business firm to do the same?
This analogy is faulty, however, for two reasons. First, patients
are not encouraged to look for doctors who will only give "good"
opinions. They seek rather to obtain the benefits of varied expe-
rience that another physician might bring, hoping to assess more
accurately the realities of an existing physical condition. In con-
trast, the opinion shopper already knows what answer it seeks
and is merely looking for some auditor to lend credibility to the
firm's chosen approach.59 Second, in the medical setting, the
opinion has immediate implications only for the patient. In the
financial environment, the opinion is primarily for the benefit of
third parties (e.g., creditors and investors), not the party seeking
the opinion, who generally knows quite well the economic reality
of the situation."' Second opinions should not normally be en-
couraged in the accounting of economic transactions.
56. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 42, at 126, 128.
Analogies have also been made to the accepted practice of obtaining second or addi-
tional legal interpretations, asset appraisals, engineering reports, and actuarial valua-
tions. In some cases, the failure of management to obtain such additonal reports might
even be deemed an act of negligence. Serlin, supra note 14, at 78. If nothing else, analo-
gies of this sort suggest that some forms of opinion shopping may be quite legitimate.
59. Sack, supra note 42, at 128. "The most glaring cases of accounting shopping don't
involve merely a second 6pinion; rather, they involve explicit searches for an auditor who
will agree." Id.
60. Id. Over 50 years ago, Arthur Andersen, after whom one of the Big Eight account-
ing firms is named, said: "[I]t has long been recognized that the published financial
statements of corporations are clothed with a public interest and that the accountant has
a responsibility to the public as well as to his client." Id. at 125. This theme was reiter-
ated in 1972 by Robert M. Trueblood, a former chairman of Touche Ross & Co.: "The
public is the accountant's only client in the world today. The public is the accountant's
consumer." Id.; see also Karmel, supra note 2, at 959 ("Although accountants serve the
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Another frequently cited response by accountants is that any
attempt to reduce auditor changes will likely have an anticom-
petitive effect on the auditing industry. The result of any re-
strictions on switching auditors may be to entrench existing au-
ditors with their present clients."1 In fact, accountants suggest,
there may be situations where firms do not switch auditors often
enough.62 Although theoretically this might be a valid concern,
recent developments in the profession suggest that, if anything,
the profession is more than sufficiently competitive at the pre-
sent time.63 In any event, the thesis of this Note is not that audi-
tor changes should be proscribed or that their frequency be even
moderately reduced. The concern is, rather, over auditor
changes made solely or primarily for the purpose of obtaining a
different, and presumably more favorable, accounting interpre-
tation. Ideally, the proper recording of financial events should be
independent of the individual firm responsible for auditing those
records.
A related argument is that companies may have legitimate
reasons for switching auditors; proposals that address the spe-
cific problem of opinion shopping often cannot distinguish be-
tween valid and invalid reasons for making a change. Firms may
well have a combination of reasons for making a change. 4 Al-
though this is a realistic concern, it should be emphasized that a
fair number of reported auditor changes do involve auditor-cli-
ent conflicts over accounting treatment. One study reports that
fourteen percent of all auditor changes followed disagreements
particular enterprises that retain them, their work is intended for the use and benefit of
third parties who have an interest in the financial statements of those enterprises.").
61. "Independent auditors were also accused of surrendering their independence
when they served a corporation too long and became too comfortable with management
that controlled the appointment of its external auditors. Finally, external auditors were
accused of performing less than professional audit services when their appointments be-
came routine." Kunitake, Auditor Changes by Audit Committees and Outside Directors,
AKRON Bus. & EcON. REv., Fall 1983, at 48, 48; see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 551
(suggesting that some auditor-client relationships have continued for as long as 30
years).
62. Hearings, supra note 3, at 551 (questioning by Congressman Shelby indicating
that perhaps audit terms should be limited by the SEC so that companies would get a
"fresh look" by new auditors on a periodic basis).
63. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
64. Interviews with public companies that had recently changed auditors revealed
that 32% had done so because they could obtain the service at a lower cost, 29% because
they sought better service, and 19% because they required the services of a larger ac-
counting firm, although frequently more than one reason was cited. Interestingly, a qual-
ified or disclaimed opinion preceded 19% of the changes. Hearings, supra note 3, at 701
(statement of Arthur W. Bowman).
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between client and auditor. 5 This figure only represents cases
where the SEC requires this disclosure because there has been
an actual auditor change; there are likely many more cases
where disagreements went unreported because the auditor was
not replaced. The company may have acceded to the auditor's
choice of treatment, or the auditor may have "compromised" his
standards to appease the client. Even where the auditor was re-
placed, disagreements may never have been reported because
the auditor believed, correctly or incorrectly, that other more
significant factors were responsible for the client's decision.6 In
any event, auditor-client disputes over accounting treatment fre-
quently do occur.6 7 When coupled with the tremendous competi-
tive pressures in the profession, the temptation for auditors to
lower their "independent" standards is, undoubtedly, very great.
B. Past Regulatory Attempts
Opinion shopping is not a new activity. George 0. May, for-
mer head partner of Price, Waterhouse & Co., addressed the
problem in a speech in 1926.68 The SEC likewise has, on differ-
ent occasions, expressed its concern over the practice. In 1974, it
published Accounting Series Release (ASR) 165, which amended
Form 8-K to make the resignation or dismissal of accountants a
reportable event.6 9 The release also clarified the Commission's
intent "to require a description of all disagreements [between
auditor and client], including those where the disagreement was
resolved to the satisfaction of the accountant. '7' This latter re-
quirement was watered down two years later in ASR 194, which
demanded disclosure of a previously reported disagreement only
in those cases where a successor auditor adopted an approach
rejected by the client's previous accountant.71 In 1978, the Com-
65. McConnell, Auditor Change Disagreement Involvement: Big Eight and Non-Big
Eight Firms, OHIO C.P.A. J., Winter 1984, at 21, 22.
66. See Request for Comments on "Opinion Shopping," supra note 9, at 28,220 n.13
("In other words, some accountants may have a tendency to rationalize their loss of a
client in an attempt to avoid any ill will or for other reasons.").
67. For an example of a case where Arthur Andersen & Co. lost a client because of a
disagreement over accounting treatment, see Hearings, supra note 3, at 697.
68. Newman, SEC Commentary: Opinion Shopping, C.P.A. J., Jan. 1986, at 81, 83.
69. Accounting Series Release No. 165, supra note 50, at 62,395. Prior to that release,
only the engagement of a new accountant triggered the Form 8-K disclosure. Id.
70. Id. at 62,396.
71. Accounting Series Release No. 194, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 72,216, at 62,514, 62,516 (Apr. 29, 1976).
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mission voiced its concern that the practice of reporting dis-
agreements in Form 8-K filings had seriously deteriorated, refer-
ring to filings where the registrant had indicated no
disagreements, while the former accountant's letter had con-
cluded that reportable disagreements did occur. 2
Apparently the SEC was not particularly satisfied with the re-
sults.7" In July 1985, it issued a concept release in which it solic-
ited comments on proposals for further disclosure require-
ments.74 The Commission basically considered three variations
of opinion-shopping-related disclosure. The first proposal would
have required disclosure whenever "(1) the registrant solicited
opinions from other accountants on specific accounting issues
concerning existing or contemplated transactions, or (2) the reg-
istrant engaged an accountant expressing an opinion which is
different from its former accountant's position. 76 Such disclos-
ure would be mandated even in the absence of a "disagreement,"
although only where the actions were accompanied by an actual
change in auditors. The second proposal was more stringent, re-
quiring disclosure whenever a company asked another account-
ant for an opinion on an accounting issue, regardless of whether
a change in accountants occurred. The third approach required a
company to disclose the names of any accountants consulted
prior to adopting any change in accounting principles.
76
The comments received by the SEC were overwhelmingly neg-
ative. " Most of the respondents believed that the existing self-
regulatory system was more than sufficient.7s Others were willing
to submit to additional disclosure requirements, but only when
there had been an actual change in auditors, not just a disagree-
ment. 9 If any of the proposals were going to be adopted, how-
ever, the consensus seemed to be that the first option was the
most palatable, with the second variation the least acceptable."0
The accounting profession apparently began to appreciate the
seriousness of the SEC's concern, however, because it initiated
certain reforms of its own during the period immediately subse-
72. Accounting Series Release No. 247, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 72,269, at 62,711 (May 26, 1978).
73. Nor has Congress been particularly thrilled with the SEC's efforts in this regard.
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 590 (remarks by Congressman Wyden).
74. Request for Comments on "Opinion Shopping," supra note 9.
75. Id. at 28,220.
76. Id.
77. Newman, supra note 68, at 81.
78. Id. at 81-82.
79. Id. at 82.
80. Id. at 81-82.
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quent to the issuance of the concept release. One of these
changes involved the amendment of the requirements for mem-
bership in the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA's Division for
CPA firms. 1 As of January 1, 1986, all members were required
to establish standards for the rendering of accounting advice to
non-audit clients and to subject these standards to periodic peer
review."2 The AICPA also drafted a letter to the SEC proposing
certain changes to the Form 8-K requirements in connection
with auditor changes.8 3 At about the same time, the Accounting
Standards Board adopted the Statement on Auditing Standards
50 (SAS 50), Reports on the Application of Accounting Princi-
ples. " Like the SECPS requirements, SAS 50 prescribes de-
tailed guidelines for, and documentation of, consultations with
nonclients regarding accounting applications. 5
Convinced that more disclosure was required, however, the
SEC proposed additional disclosure rules in June 1987.8' These
rules were, with minor modification, formally adopted by the
Commission effective May 20, 1988.87 Only time will tell whether
these changes will materially reduce the incidence of opinion
shopping.
81. See Maltzman, Issuing Reports on the Application of Accounting Principles
Under SAS No. 50 (the "Opinion Shopping" statement), C.P.A. J., Jan. 1987, at 93, 94.
82. Id.
83. See Washington Update: AICPA Urges Revisions to Form 8-K On Auditor
Changes, J. AccT., Nov. 1986, at 72.
84. REPORTS ON APPLICATION OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, Statement on Auditing Prin-
ciples No. 50, § 625 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1986) [hereinafter SAS 50];
see Opinion Shopping is Focus of New SAS, J. AccT., Oct. 1986, at 24; Urbancic, New
SAS on Opinion Shopping, C.P.A. J., Sept. 1986, at 101.
85. SAS 50, supra note 84; see Urbancic, supra note 84, at 101. The Statement essen-
tially identifies the factors that should be considered and the "due diligence" review that
should precede the rendering of advice on a particular application of GAAP. It also enu-
merates the content of any written report that accompanies such advice. SAS 50, supra
note 84.
86. See Disclosure Amendments to Regulation S-K and Forms 8-K and N-SAR Re-
garding Changes in Accountants and Opinion Shopping, Exchange Act Release No.
24,608, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,018, at 24,021 (1987) [hereinafter Disclosure Amendments
(proposed)].
87. Disclosure Amendments to Regulation S-K, Form 8-K and Schedule 14A Regard-
ing Changes in Accountants and Potential Opinion Shopping Situations, Exchange Act
Release No. 25,578, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,924 (Apr. 20, 1988) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§
229, 240 & 249) [hereinafter Disclosure Amendments (final)]. See infra notes 91-97 and
accompanying text. While the proposed draft was still open for comments, the National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, led by Chairman James C. Treadway,
Jr., submitted its final recommendations on how the profession should address the prob-
lem of fraudulent financial reporting. One of its recommendations, interestingly, was that
there be additional disclosure of auditor changes by public companies. See Fraud Com-




C. Existing Structural Safeguards
Among the existing structural mechanisms designed to dis-
courage opinion shopping, certainly the most visible and direct
are the SEC disclosure rules. Until recently, Item 4 of Form 8-K
("Changes in Registrant's Certifying Accountant") required a
registrant with the SEC to identify its reason or reasons for
changing auditors8 8 The Item also required the registrant to re-
quest that the replaced auditor "furnish the registrant with a
letter addressed to the Commission stating whether it agrees
with the statements made by the registrant. . and, if not, stat-
ing the respects in which it does not agree."' 9 Despite this re-
quirement, many companies and accounting firms remained un-
willing to acknowledge that differences of opinion may
constitute "disagreements. 90
The SEC's recent adoption of significant new disclosure rules
is an attempt to correct this problem.91 These rules amend Form
8-K, Regulation S-K, and Schedule 14A to provide, in connec-
tion with a change in auditors, for: 1) a statement as to whether
the former auditor resigned, declined to stand for reelection, or
was dismissed; 2) a statement on whether the auditor's report
for either of the past two fiscal years contained anything other
than an unqualified opinion; and 3) a statement on whether the
auditor change was approved by an audit or similar committee
88. Form 8-K, Item 4, 42 Fed. Reg. 4430 (1977) (amended 1988). "Item 4 requires
disclosure whenever an accountant resigns, indicates he declines to stand for re-election
after the completion of the current audit, is dismissed or another independent account-
ant is engaged." Hearings, supra note 3, at 471 n.13 (statement of Chairman Shad). In
addition, if a company has received anything other than an unqualified opinion within
the two years prior to changing auditors, it must also provide a description of that opin-
ion. Id. at 471 n.15.
89. Item 4(d), 42 Fed. Reg. at 4430.
90. See Request for Comments on "Opinion Shopping," supra note 9, at 28,220 n.13;
see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 152 (testimony of Dr. Briloff); id. at 568-83 (testi-
mony of Chairman Shad); id. at 720 (testimony of Arthur K. Bowman).
"Disagreements are defined [by the SEC] as disputes, whether resolved or not, occur-
ring at the decision-making level involving accounting principles or practices, financial
statement disclosure or auditing scope or procedures." McConnell, supra note 65, at 21.
91. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. The SEC has also issued a companion
release that proposes to shorten the time periods for filing Form 8-K and for filing the
former accountant's letter in response; it would also require the registrant to file the
former creditor's letter with the Commission within 48 hours of its receipt. See Amend-
ments to Regulation S-K Regarding Changes in Accountants; Acceleration of the Timing
for Filing Forms 8-K Relating to Changes in Accountants and Resignations of Directors,
Exchange Act Release No. 25,579, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,230 (Apr. 7, 1988).
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of the board of directors.2 Perhaps more significantly, the rules
also provide for a broader definition of disagreements 3 and for
the identification and disclosure of certain "reportable events." 9'
In addition, the rules prescribe further disclosure of the nature
of any consultations by the registrant within the last two fiscal
years with its newly engaged auditor regarding 1) specific ac-
counting applications or 2) any disagreements or "reportable
events" with its former auditors.95 Other less significant changes
92. Disclosure Amendments (final), supra note- 87, at 12,929 (to be codified at 17
CFR § 229.304(a)(1)(i-iii)).
93. Disclosure Amendments (final), supra note 87, at 12,929 (to be codified at 17
CFR § 229.304(a)(1)(iv)). The registrant must:
State whether during the registrant's two most recent fiscal years and any subse-
quent interim period preceding such resignation, declination or dismissal there
were any disagreements with the former accountant on any matter of accounting
principles or practices, financial statement disclosure, or auditing scope or proce-
dure, which disagreement(s), if not resolved to the satisfaction of the former
accountant, would have caused it to make reference to the subject matter of the
disagreement(s) in connection with its report. Also, (A) describe each such disa-
greement; (B) state whether any audit or similar committee of the board of di-
rectors, or the board of directors, discussed the subject matter of each of such
disagreements with the former accountant; and (C) state whether the registrant
has authorized the former accountant to respond fully to the inquiries of the
successor accountant concerning the subject matter of each of such disagree-
ments and, if not, describe the nature of any limitation thereon and the reason
therefore. The disagreements required to be reported in response to this Item
include both those resolved to the former accountant's satisfaction and those not
resolved to the former accountant's satisfaction. Disagreements contemplated by
this Item are those that occur at the decision-making level, i.e., between person-
nel of the registrant responsible for presentation of its financial statements and
personnel of the accounting firm responsible for rendering its report.
Id.
The final draft of the regulations deleted the proposed disclosure of any consultations
with other accountants whose views differed materially from that of the company's new
auditor. Compare Disclosure Amendments (proposed), supra note 86, at 24,026 with Dis-
closure Amendments (final), supra note 87, at 12,925.
94. The amendment requires the disclosure of any of the following four "reportable
events," even if there was no difference of opinion on the event between the registrant
and its auditor:
(1) Where the auditor has advised the registrant that its internal controls are grossly
inadequate;
(2) Where the auditor has notified the registrant that it can no longer rely on manage-
ment's representations or that it is unwilling to be associated with the registrant's finan-
cial statements;
(3) Where the registrant has been advised by its auditor that the scope of the audit
must be significantly expanded, and that further investigation might impact the fairness
or reliability of past or pending financial statements; or
(4) Where the registrant has been notified by the auditor that it has information in its
possession that would prevent it from rendering an unqualified opinion report on either
past or pending financial statements and that, because of its resignation, dismissal, or
declination to stand for reelection, the issues have not been satisfactorily resolved.
95. Disclosure Amendments (final), supra note 87, at 12,930 (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 229.304(a)(2)). In such cases, the registrant is required to disclose (1) the nature
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also were effected by the rules, including a transfer of many dis-
closure requirements from Item 4 of Form 8-K to Item 304 of
Regulation S-K.96 The SEC asserts that these rules will not im-
pose significant new costs on registrants.9 7 Unfortunately, these
additional rules are simply more of the existing remedy and do
not address the fundamental roots of the opinion-shopping
problem.
The AICPA has also attempted to address the problem of au-
ditor shopping through its "peer review" requirement." This re-
quirement covers most public auditors, because members of the
AICPA Division for CPA firms audit eighty-six percent of all
publicly traded U.S. companies.99 Membership, entails numerous
obligations. Every three years, for example, members permit
their audit practices to be reviewed by fellow auditors.100 The
members also agree, among other things, to rotate audit partners
every seven years, to provide for second-partner review on all
SEC-registered clients, to notify the client's board of directors or
audit committee of any serious disagreements with management,
and to conduct an annual quality-control review." 1
of the issues discussed, (2) the views of the newly engaged accountant on the issue, and
(3) the former auditor's view, if consulted on the issue. In addition, the registrant must
request both the new and the former auditors to review the company's disclosure and
file, as an exhibit, any letter from either auditor that attempts to clarify or correct the
registrant's disclosure. Id.
96. 53 Fed. Reg. at 12,928. The amended rules also revise Item 9(d) of Schedule 14A
to provide that the disclosure of auditor changes for proxy statement purposes encom-
passes the two most recent fiscal years and any subsequent interim period, and not just
the period since the most recent proxy statement for the annual meeting of shareholders.
Id.
97. Id.
98. The primary mechanism for the self-regulation of accounting firms is the
AICPA's division for CPA firms. Created in 1977, it consists of an SEC practice section
(SECPS) and a private companies practice section (PCPS). Membership in either organ-
ization is voluntary. The POB is the entity charged with the oversight of the SECPS. For
a brief description of the history and activities of these organizations, see Peer Review
and the Public Oversight Board: Doing the Job, J. AccT., May 1985, at 122 [hereinafter
Peer Review and the POB].
99. AICPA President Responds to Plan for New Oversight Group, J. ACCT., Feb.
1986, at 14, 14.
"According to the POB 1983-84 annual report, almost 1,700 firms are members of the
Division [for CPA Firms], 430 of which are members of the SECPS. Of the 430 members,
196 have one or more SEC registered clients. These 196 firms audit approximately 85%
of all SEC registrants." Hearings, supra note 3, at 511 (statement of Chairman Shad).
100. See Peer Review and the POB, supra note 98, at 122.
101. Id. In addition, the chairman of the Public Oversight Board "has recently rec-
ommended that SECPS membership requirements be revised to explicitly require suc-
cessor accountants to document their consultations with predecessor firms, and that peer
reviewers examine such documentation and make appropriate inquiries of the predeces-
sor firms when necessary." Request for Comments on "Opinion Shopping," supra note 9,
at 28,220 n.9.
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This seemingly comprehensive self-regulatory system has its
critics, however. One problem, of course, is that a number of
public auditing firms are not participants in the peer review pro-
cess. 102 The far more significant criticism, however, is that the
reviews have no "teeth."0 s The vast majority of firms pass the
reviews, and for those that fail there are only very limited sanc-
tions.1 " The problem of auditor shopping, moreover, is not one
of audit technique (e.g., failure to conduct basic audit tests), but
rather one of tainted judgment: dare we certify the client's
choice of accounting treatment? The reviews tend to concentrate
102. "It has been estimated that as many as 700 firms that audit at least one Com-
mission [SEC] registrant do not participate in the profession's voluntary self-regulatory
program." Thomas, SEC Oversight Role in Self-Regulation, C.P.A. J., May 1983, at 10,
12; see also Karmel, supra note 2, at 974 (describing the absence of a compulsory mem-
bership requirement as a "troublesome problem").
One of the peer review requirements, the second-partner review, applies only to audits
of SEC registrants. This exempts audits of private companies from the rule. The case of
E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc., where massive fraud went undetected by public au-
dit, is an example of a private company exempt from the peer review requirements. See
Stevens, supra note 3, at 57-59.
103. "Despite continual press reports of audit and accounting problems, the peer re-
view system has not found much to criticize in the way its members perform their re-
sponsibilities." Hearings, supra note 3, at 3 (introductory remarks by Rep. John D.
Dingell, presiding).
Sandy Burton, former Chief Accountant to the SEC, claims that it is our "antitrust
laws [that] make it extremely difficult for [any] profession to develop a process with any
real disciplinary teeth." Burton, The Profession's Institutional Structure in the 1980's,
J. AccT., Apr. 1978, at 63, 66-67.
104. POB statistics indicate that 95 of the approximately 3200 audits reviewed, or
about three percent (3%), were determined to be substandard. In only one-third of these
cases were the auditors required to perform additional procedures or to revise and reis-
sue their opinions. Peer Review and the POB, supra note 98, at 131.
The SECPS's corrective actions may involve one or more of the following: ordering
accelerated or special peer reviews; requiring firms to hire additional personnel or make
various personnel changes; imposing additional continuing education requirements on
partners and employees; and requiring supplemental supervision over certain audit work.
The Section's ultimate sanction is expulsion of the firm from membership in SECPS
(membership that, incidentally, was voluntary) and public disclosure of the expulsion.
Id.
Despite these sanctions, the record has not always been impressive. "In one glaring
case, Price Waterhouse issued a relatively clean opinion for Fox & Company shortly
before that firm was found to have systemic deficiencies in its audit practice, culminating
in an SEC-imposed one-year ban on the acceptance of new publicly listed clients." Ste-
vens, supra note 3, at 61. Indeed, while the Section has been successful in obtaining
voluntary cooperation, it has yet to impose any "formal" sanctions to date. See Thomas,
supra note 102, at 14. Even the chairman of the Public Oversight Board, Arthur M.
Wood, has described as "disquieting" the fact that none of the firms under scrutiny by
the Dingell subcommittee had ever received an adverse or negative audit opinion. POB
Report, supra note 3, at 142. He goes on to say that this "suggests that we cannot take
much comfort from the statistic that the overwhelming majority of member firms con-
duct their practices in accordance with [professional] standards." It may, he concludes,
imply the need for "changes of a more fundamental nature." Id.
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on the former over the latter.""8 Furthermore, the pressure to
satisfy clients is firm-wide and is usually not limited to one par-
ticular delinquent partner.106 Any intrafirm checks are likely to
be fairly ineffective.
The vast majority of large, publicly held U.S. companies now
have independent audit committees. °1 0  Although the change has
probably been for the better, at least one empirical study has
concluded that the presence or absence of audit committees does
not appear to affect the frequency with which companies change
auditors.10 8 Consequently, the net impact of independent audit
committees on the practice of opinion shopping is not clear.
Accountants also often respond that the threat of SEC injunc-
tions and disciplinary actions,"0 ' not to mention civil and crimi-
105. Dr. Briloff provides a colorful analogy:
Insofar as PR [peer review] is concerned, I am reminded of the drunk who lost
his keys in the middle of the block, but went looking for them at the corner
where the light was better. Thus, the PR team studies the form of the work
papers, manuals of practice, employment and promotion practices (to the extent
they are reduced to paper) and the like. What's missing? The recognition that
the critical judgment calls are essentially behavioral phenomena-and these can-
not generally be recognized by a hard trail.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 127-28.
106. The second-partner review, for example, has been criticized as follows:
Second-partner review, the critical check on improper activity, is compromised
by the close working relationship between audit partners. The tendency, espe-
cially in those offices where the partners have worked together for years, is to
regard the review as a back-scratching exercise. You scratch mine, I'll scratch
yours. Because audit partners are overwhelmed with work stemming from their
own engagements, their capacity to focus clearly on what is essentially someone
else's responsibility is questionable. Although they are warned repeatedly that
the firm's reputation rests with their diligence, checking the other guy's audit
gets pushed into the "low-priority" column.
Stevens, supra note 3, at 61; see also Request for Comments on "Opinion Shopping,"
supra note 9, at 28,221 (referring to "the potential for 'shopping' for a different engage-
ment partner within the registrant's current accounting firm").
107. Only outside directors are now permitted on the audit committees of companies
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Kunitake, supra note 61, at 48. The American
Stock Exchange only recommends such audit committees. Id. at 49. As of mid-1980,
about 78% of companies listed on the American Stock Exchange had independent audit
committees. Id.
Audit committees have also received strong SEC encouragement. See, e.g., Accounting
Series Release No. 123, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,125 at
62,300 (Mar. 23, 1972); Accounting Series Release No. 247, supra note 72, at 62,710.
108. Kunitake, supra note 61, at 52. The author also discusses the concern that
outside directors tend to replace smaller audit firms with larger ones, concluding, how-
ever, that the data do not seem to confirm those fears. Id.
109. The SEC has a variety of enforcement and remedial powers at its disposal: ob-
taining a federal court injunction, perhaps including ancillary equitable relief; instituting
administrative proceedings, which often require the issuers to reissue defective financial
statements; publishing reports of investigations; censuring individual firms for failing to
apply GAAP properly or for participating in a violation of federal securities law; and
denying, either temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing
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nal lawsuits,110 acts as a powerful deterrent to "cooking the
books." Critics, however, have asserted that the few direct en-
forcement actions undertaken by the SEC against large account-
ing firms amount to little more than slaps on the wrist, even
against repeat offenders.1 Rarely will there be any admission of
wrongdoing; consent decrees are frequently the most severe
sanction.1 Civil suits usually are similarly fruitless, if only be-
cause the auditor can easily find refuge from liability within the
gray areas of "generally accepted accounting principles." When
even the auditor is not sure whether she has violated any stan-
dard or law, or when the audit result is at least arguably defensi-
ble, it is not likely that stiffer sanctions would be a solution
anyway." 3
If nothing else, the defenders assert, the Code of Professional
Conduct" 4 will act as a significant restraining force on auditor
misbehavior. Until January 1988, the Code essentially required a
"shopped" auditor to consult first with the company's present
auditors so as to be fully informed about the facts surrounding
the disputed issue." 5 The Code's definition of opinion shopping,
however, was so broad as to encompass many situations that au-
before the Commission. Hearings, supra note 3, at 482-85 (statement of Chairman
Shad); see also Gruenbaum, The SEC's Use of Rule 2(e) to Discipline Accountants and
Other Professionals, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 820 (1981).
110. See Request for Comments on "Opinion Shopping," supra note 9, at 28,220 n.10,
for a concise description of possible securities law violations. See Note, supra note 3, at
934-44, for an excellent discussion of auditor liability both under the common law and
under federal securities law.
111. "The few direct enforcement actions undertaken by the SEC in its enforcement
responsibilities against large accounting firms appear to result in what can properly be
termed mere wrist slaps, even when the firm is a repeat offender." Hearings, supra note
3, at 3 (opening remarks by Rep. John D. Dingell, presiding). Just one example of this is
the Broadview Financial Corp. situation described supra notes 31-35 and accompanying
text. Although the SEC had challenged the accounting treatment of the transaction, it
declined to take any enforcement action against Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, Broadview's
auditors. Ingersoll, supra note 32.
For a summary of SEC enforcement actions against auditing firms, partners, and em-
ployees, see Hearings, supra note 3, at 679-93. In all fairness, perhaps it ought to be
added that the Commission has attempted to step up its enforcement actions in recent
years. The SEC brought 18 cases of alleged misconduct in 1984, compared to 11 in 1983
and only three in 1982. Id. at 482 (statement of Chairman Shad).
112. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 153-54. A consent decree is an arrangement
whereby the accounting firm agrees to revise its opinion or take other remedial action as
determined by the SEC, without admitting any error or wrongdoing.
113. Cf. Karmel, supra note 2, at 976-77 (opposing the thesis that legal liability for
accountants "is the most effective mechanism for assuring that independent auditors
perform their public responsibilities competently and diligently").
114. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 8.
115. Id. at § 201-3 (1978) (deleted 1988).
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ditors did not believe merited such extensive action.'16 The re-
sult was that auditors sometimes found the rule impracticable.
1 17
A special committee of the AICPA charged with studying the
Code concluded that accountant behavior had ceased to be influ-
enced by the rules." 8 In 1988, the Code was substantially re-
vised, and the provision dealing with opinion shopping was
deleted.
Finally, there are those who assert that the auditor's concern
for his reputation and his sense of professional pride are suffi-
cient to ensure the highest standards of financial reporting. One
would like to think that this alone would serve as an adequate
check on audit abuse. Unfortunately, even the chairman of the
Public Oversight Board (POB) recently commented that the ac-
countant's sense of professionalism "has not been sufficient to
snuff out the insidious practice of 'opinion shopping. "19
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE? A ROLE FOR LEGAL REFORM
A variety of approaches, including more expansive disclosure,
have been advocated as solutions to the problem of opinion
shopping. As the next Section indicates, however, many of these
approaches have serious inadequacies. What is needed is a plan
that enables the client and its auditor to identify the most ap-
propriate accounting treatment in a specific case-free from the
concern that some other accounting firm might have "permit-
ted" a more lenient treatment. This Section proposes such a
plan.
116.
Broadly interpreted, the AICPA definition would encompass .. even a casual
inquiry by a company officer at a cocktail party-for example, how goodwill aris-
ing from a recent acquisition might be amortized. The Ethics Rule interpreta-
tion conceivably covers not only executed transactions, but proposed transac-
tions as well. The interpretation might also encompass services to assist a client
in researching and interpreting the accounting literature.
Serlin, supra note 14, at 77.
117. Serlin was perhaps too cautious when he concluded that "it may be impractica-
ble to comply with the consultation requirement in every case." Id.
118. Anderson, supra note 51, at 92.
119. POB Report, supra note 3, at 146.
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A. Alternative Approaches to the Problem
One obvious approach to the problem of opinion shopping is
to emphasize the benefits of greater disclosure, as the SEC has
done. 120 The problem with this approach is that it fails to ad-
dress the fundamental difficulty of identifying the "correct" ac-
counting treatment in individual cases. Even the SEC recognizes
that disputes regarding the appropriate recording of complex or
unconventional events are often legitimate and expected.121 But
rather than encourage frank discussion of such issues, the dis-
closure rules discourage and stifle open dialogue by their im-
plicit presumption that the registrant is attempting to thwart
the fair reporting of an accounting event. The disclosure rules
impose a red flag on the disagreement similar to the scarlet let-
ter that Hester Prynne was forced to wear in Hawthorne's im-
mortal work.122 Such a heightened level of public scrutiny will
only serve as a disincentive to bring disputes into the open. 2 ' As
past experience has proven, accountants have been very reluc-




120. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text. The chairman of the Public
Oversight Board, Arthur M. Wood, has also advocated more disclosure. Specifically, he
would amend the peer review process to require documentation that firms made appro-
priate inquiry of the predecessor auditor before accepting a new audit client. POB Re-
port, supra note 3, at 146.
121. See Serlin, supra note 14, at 78.
122. N. HAWTHORNE, THE ScARLET LErTR (1850).
123. An editor's comment to a recent article describing the SEC's proposed disclosure
rules (before they were formally adopted) provides a unique insight into management's
perspective on the utility and desirability of such disclosure:
Corporate officers at major companies are generally opposed to such disclo-
sures. They do not think that trying to find the most favorable application of
accounting principles need necessarily be labeled opinion shopping. In their
opinion, tough new rules would serve no useful purpose and would only inhibit
discussions with helpful accounting firms other than their auditors. Forcing
companies to disclose every discussion with their accounting firms is disclosure-
overkill that could creat apprehension and confusion among investors.
Proposed SEC Rules Would Provide for Increased Disclosure of Disagreements and
Possible Opinion Shopping Situations in Connection With a Change in Accountants,
C.P.A. J., Dec. 1987, at 98, 99 (emphasis added).
124. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. The SEC itself has listed, without
necessarily endorsing, a number of reasons for not mandating disclosure, as an earlier
Accounting Series Release indicates:
Opposition commentators argued that the disclosure [of reasons for changing
independent accountants] was probably not useful and, in their view, meaningful
information would not be presented for a variety of reasons. Most often cited
were that the disclosures would take the form of "boilerplate" (e.g., "audit rota-
tion policy," "need a fresh look," etc.); that accountants would be unable to
make meaningful comments on subjective reasons (e.g., "poor service," "high
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The more significant problem, however, is that additional dis-
closure does not attempt to resolve the underlying dispute. The
SEC's approach provides no new mechanism for assisting the in-
dependent auditor in making what can occasionally be very diffi-
cult judgment calls on these issues. Instead, the new rules bury
legitimate issues under the guise (ironically) of additional
disclosure.
The above problems are related to another recent phenome-
non in the profession. At least partly because of the competitive
pressure to interpret accounting rules most favorably for the cli-
ent, accountants have gradually relegated more and more judg-
mental issues to GAAP (as defined by the FASB). In doing so,
the profession has come to rely more on legalistic rules to deter-
mine appropriate accounting treatment, with less of a concern
for which treatment actually best describes reality in specific ap-
plications. The profession has thus begun to lose touch with the
needs of the users of financial information. The accountant has
become a rule interpreter, often finding it necessary to "bend"
the rule to fit an unforeseen or unconventional situation. Once
this is understood, it becomes easy to see why firms are tempted
to seek a more favorable interpretation of a rule. Economic real-
ity is no longer the relevant criterion; the only thing that mat-
ters is the auditor's willingness to give a particular interpreta-
tion to a formalistic rule.
A second approach to the opinion-shopping problem is to
limit directly the ability of client firms to change auditors. These
proposals vary from outright prohibitions on auditor changes
that exceed some standard of frequency-e.g., more than once
every five years-to requirements of a showing of "business rea-
son" for any auditor change. There may, however, be some very
good reasons for permitting more frequent auditor changes, es-
pecially if one wishes to preserve any of the benefits of competi-
tion in the industry.12 Unfortunately, a firm may very easily
identify legitimate reasons for an auditor change while masking
fees"); that disclosure of reasons for all changes might downgrade or obscure the
disclosures of disagreements now required; that candid disclosures would not be
made for fear of litigation involving libel or other allegations; and that disclosure
might inhibit changes in accountants (i.e., that it might tend to lead to a contin-
uation of unsatisfactory situations in an effort to avoid disclosure).
Accounting Series Release No. 247, supra note 72, at 62,711.
125. By statutory mandate, the SEC is required to consider the impact any of its
proposed rules or regulations would have on competition. See, e.g., Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 w(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986); see also supra notes 61-63.
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other less legitimate sources of discontent; 26 there could be good
reasons, bad reasons, or a combination of good and bad reasons
for any particular change of auditors.'
A third approach is to take auditing from the private sector
and make it a public function.12 8 Proponents suggest this as the
only way to resolve the inherent conflict of interest in a situation
where the "independent" auditor is compensated by the audited
company itself. 29 Examples of this third approach range from
proposals to have the federal government award audit fees and
assignments to private accountants through a central clearing-
house, 30 to the establishment of a Federal Board of Public Ac-
countancy,'"' to the creation of a federal corps of auditors.' 2
These types of proposals have generally been rejected for one
of two reasons. First, any such recommendation is certain to
meet with formidable resistance from the profession.13 Account-
ants have a long and cherished tradition as being a self-regu-
lated profession.'8 4 They have invested much in the way of
structural devices designed to maintain their historically high
standards of professional conduct. Such reforms simply are not
126. Dr. Briloff, for example, has indicated that any disclosure as to the reasons for
an auditor change is bound to be couched in "cover your anatomy" rhetoric, suggesting
that auditors can avoid this sort of disclosure "rather expeditiously." Hearings, supra
note 3, at 152; see also supra note 124 (regarding the "boilerplate" problem).
127. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
128. For an historical account of the decision to rely on the private sector for the
development of accounting principles, see Cooper & Robinson, Who Should Formulate
Accounting Principles? The Debate Within the SEC, J. AccT., May 1987, at 137.
129. See supra notes 9 & 11 and accompanying text.
130. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 10, 31 (testimony and statement, respectively, of
Robert Chatov).
131. See id. at 728 (testimony of Eli Mason, managing partner of Eli Mason & Co.,
New York City, and chairman of the National Conference of CPA Practitioners). Joseph
E. Connor, chairman and senior partner of Price Waterhouse, has also recommended the
establishment of a federally created self-regulatory organization (SRO) that would essen-
tially replace the SECPS. News Report: AICPA President Responds to Plan for New
Oversight Group, J. AccT., Feb. 1986, at 14.
132. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 10, 27 (testimony and statement, respectively, of
Robert Chatov describing what he calls the "GAO model"). Apparently, Congress consid-
ered establishing a corps of government auditors at the same time it legislated the for-
mation of the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Karmel, supra note 2, at 965
(citing Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 57-59 (1933) (remarks of Sans. Adams and Reynolds) (1933)).
133. See, e.g., infra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages of
- self-regulation over government intervention).
134. The professional pride to which many accountants aspire is amply evident in
this appeal by one accountant: "Even with the occasional bad publicity, we need not feel
negative about our profession. Our record outshines that of any other professional calling
and we should defend the profession to the press, in Washington, to our clients, and
among our social and business clients. Show your pride!" Pearlman, supra note 43, at 85.
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politically feasible. 13 5 Second, traditional western ideology pre-
fers private enterprise over public control to the extent that the
private sector can equally address the needs of society. Any form
of centralized planning or nationalization should only be insti-
tuted where the mandate for such action is very clear.
B. What is Needed
The solution to these problems rests in separating the client-
retention question from the choice-of-accounting-treatment
question. 136 The investing public has no qualms about auditor
changes per se; what it desires is consistency and comparability
in reporting, regardless of who happens to be conducting the
audit.
1 7
The establishment of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board was designed to achieve exactly that result.' 8 The
Board's approach, however, has been to take accounting issues
under advisement and, after much study, to pronounce an ac-
counting standard. 139 Unfortunately, the FASB faces an over-
whelming workload. In attempting to legislate standards for
every possible contingency, it has created its own albatross. The
result is that most accounting issues never reach the level that
warrants an official "pronouncement." For those that do, it is
often only after months or even years of study.' 0 In the interim,
accountants are left on their own to wrestle with the issues in-
135. "Financial standard development responsibility has been in the hands of the
private sector so long that they regard it as legitimately institutionalized . Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 28 (testimony of Robert Chatov).
136. See Sack, supra note 42, at 128.
137. Hearings, supra note 3, at 276 (testimony of Donald J. Kirk, FASB Chairman);
id. at 390 (FASB response to written questions).
138. Id. at 178-79, 276 (testimony of Donald J. Kirk); id. at 214-17 (statement of the
FASB); id. at 390 (FASB response to written questions).
Since 1973, the FASB has been recognized by both the SEC and the AICPA as the
organization primarily responsible for establishing the profession's financial reporting
standards. Its seven member Board is under the auspices of the Financial Accounting
Federation, an entity designed to be independent of all other business and professional
organizations, including the AICPA. The FASB allegedly maintains an amicable and co-
operative working relationship with the SEC characterized by "mutual non-surprise." Id.
at 178 (testimony of Donald J. Kirk).
139. See id. at 193, 200-01 (statement of the FASB) (describing the significant "due
process" that the Board goes through in adopting and implementing an accounting stan-
dard); see also Van Riper, Statements in Quotes: How Accounting Standards are Set, J.
AccT., April 1987, at 130.
140. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 193, 200-01; see also id. at 210 (the 1984 Report
of the SEC to Congress concluded that "the Commission believes that there is need for
more timely guidance on emerging issues."); id. at 393 (FASB response to written ques-
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volved. 41 Even where these pronouncements are timely, they
must then be applied to a wide variety of real world situations.
Unfortunately, many economic events today do not fit into nice,
clean categories. Novel or unconventional transactions occur
with increasing frequency; even routine transactions may have
countless variations and subtleties.142 In these cases, the ac-
countant must still exercise his professional discretion and judg-
ment. " ' These judgment calls, by their very nature, are not
tions) ("[A] continuing challenge for the FASB is the ability to provide timely solutions
to new accounting problems without compromising due process.").
141. o
Even the FASB and the Commission do not have answers to all of today's ac-
counting issues as indicated by the fact that both bodies solicit comments, some-
times over long periods of time, in order to reach an appropriate resolution of a
particular issue. Consequently, since registrants have the primary responsibility
for their financial statements, they should have the right to consult with other
accountants for legitimate purposes ....
Newman, supra note 68, at 82 (quoting one CPA firm's response to the SEC's request for
comments regarding opinion shopping disclosure).
In response to this acknowledged problem, the FASB has recently created an Emerg-
ing Issues Task Force (EITF). The Board has also expanded the scope of its Technical
Bulletins to address both emerging and implementation issues. For a broader discussion
of these changes and the background that led to them, see Hearings, supra note 3, at
225-30 (statement of the FASB). Despite the good intentions behind the EITF, it still
suffers from inadequate independent authority. The EITF typically refers approximately
half of the issues it discusses to the FASB or the AICPA for additional review and delib-
eration. Id. at 498 (statement of Chairman Shad).
Keith Wishon, Senior Manager in the New York office of Price Waterhouse, has noted
that the EITF "is the closest thing to an 'accounting court' that currently exists."
Wishon, Plugging the Gaps in the GAAP: The FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force, J.
Acer., June 1986, at 96, 105. By promoting this function of the EITF as a solution to the
opinion shopping problem, he lends credence to the desirability of the Inquiry Center
concept proposed in Part III C of this Note.
142. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 8 (testimony of Robert Chatov in which he won-
ders whether it is even realistic to expect anyone to establish comprehensive accounting
rules); id. at 109 (statement of Abraham J. Briloff that if the FASB persists in attempt-
ing to promulgate standards for all the gray areas, "it will invariably find itself con-
fronted with new shades of gray, some lighter, others darker, to which it will be con-
strained to respond"); id. at 229 (statement of the FASB citing SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 57: "The authoritative accounting literature cannot specifically address all
the novel and complex business transactions into which registrants might enter."); id. at
276 (testimony of Donald J. Kirk responding to the criticism that the FASB is to the
point of enunciating a "standard of the month" because the accounting environment is
one in which there is a "new transaction of the month"); id. at 389 (statement by the
FASB: "Broad standards often are not enough [to ensure comparable financial results],
given the complexity of many transactions, innovative arrangements, and complicated
instruments in existence today .... Disagreements about the proper application of ex-
isting standards may be the result of honest differences of professional opinion .... ");
see also Serlin, supra note 14, at 78 (companies may face complex accounting issues "for
which the proper accounting is still evolving" and for which its auditors may have had
only limited experience).
143. Of course there are those who, like Dr. Briloff, assert that accountants do not
need more standards, that this sort of exercise of professional judgment is what account-
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likely to be uniform from one accountant to another. What is
needed is some means of achieving this consistency without sac-
rificing the ability to reflect accurately the uniqueness of indi-
vidual transactions.
C. A Proposal
This Note proposes the creation of regional Accounting Issue
Inquiry Centers (AIICs) across the country.144 Mandated and
regulated by the SEC,"5 these Inquiry Centers would hear and
decide specific accounting issues as presented in fact-specific
contexts.1"' The Centers would issue rulings analogous to Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) letter rulings used in the tax area.
These rulings would become part of the public record but, like
IRS letter rulings, would have no binding precedential value in
future situations."17 Rulings could be changed by the Centers as
enlightened experience might dictate. These rulings would serve
two important functions: (1) they would protect submitting au-
ditors from any liability for relying on them in preparing audit
ants should be doing all the time. "Ironically, my colleagues lack faith in our own compe-
tence and professional expertise. Instead, they are looking for someone to give them a
dictionary and a book of rules, or a computer program." Hearings, supra note 3, at 79
(testimony of Abraham J. Briloff).
144. The initial impetus for this Inquiry Center concept must be credited to Robert
J. Sack. See Sack, supra note 42, at 128.
145. This would be done pursuant to the SEC's authority to prescribe the detail and
content of financial statements and its power to prescribe the form in which required
information is to be set forth. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa, Sched-
ule A, Items 25-27 (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b)(1)(J)-(L),
78m(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15
U.S.C. §§ 79n, 79t(a) (1982); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(e)
(1982); see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 1048-59 (memorandum from the General
Counsel of the SEC regarding "The Commission's Authority To Regulate Accountants
Who Practice Before the Commission").
Although some have questioned the extent of the SEC's authority, e.g., Karmel, supra
note 2, some members of Congress believe that the SEC has been negligent in not using
its authority to its full extent:
Finally, we must inquire about the performance of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in meeting its auditing and accounting responsibilities. The SEC
has ample statutory authority at this moment to address problems in standard-
setting and audit enforcement. Yet, the Commission seems to take great pride in
its reluctance to use the powers granted it by Congress.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Rep. John D. Dingell, presiding).
146. The Centers would be free to consider factors unique to a particular company or
industry to determine the appropriate accounting treatment.
147. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 80-20, § 17, 1980-1 C.B. 633, 644 (regarding precedential
value of IRS letter rulings).
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opinions;' 8 and (2) they would serve as valuable guides to other
auditors, especially once a body of opinions began to form a con-
sistent pattern over time. 49 The opinions of the Centers would,
of course, be binding on the particular clients involved. As a
consequence, the auditor should have considerably less fear of
being replaced, as any alternative accounting treatment would
now be considered improper regardless of who rendered the
opinion.
These Inquiry Centers would serve functions very different
from those of the Financial Accounting Standards Board. First,
the opinions rendered by the Centers would be fact-specific,
rather than in the form of general pronouncements. They would
be written to resolve accounting disputes in individual situa-
tions, with no particular attempt to anticipate related issues.6 0
Second, the opinions would not be etched in stone: the Centers
148. The SEC would have to declare that compliance with an Inquiry Center's ruling
would constitute prima facie evidence of conformance with GAAP. This declaration
would effectively preclude any action for negligence or fraud based on an improper ac-
counting disclosure, assuming all relevant information had been supplied to the Center.
149. Dr. Briloff even envisioned the possibility of periodic "Restatements" of proper
accounting practice, similar to that found in the field of law. Hearings, supra note 3, at
164. It appears that some companies already attempt to substantiate their choice of ac-
counting treatment by looking for comparable situations in the financial statements of
other companies. Serlin, supra note 14, at 78. It is interesting to note that the SEC, in
adopting the SAS 50 Performance and Reporting Standards, expressly condones and, in
fact, encourages the sort of comparison analysis that could be performed quite ideally by
the Inquiry Centers:
The performance standards indicate that the reporting accountant should con-
sider the requestor of the accountant's report, the circumstances under which
the request is made, the purpose of the request and the intended use of the
report. SAS 50 also indicates that the accountant, in forming its judgment,
should obtain an understanding of the form and substance of the transaction[s];
review applicable GAAP; if appropriate, consult with other professionals or ex-
perts; if appropriate, perform research or other procedures to ascertain and
consider the existence of credible precedents or analogies; and, when evaluating
the application of GAAP to a specific transaction or to a specific entity's finan-
cial statements, consult with the continuing accountant for that entity.
Disclosure Amandments (proposed), supra note 86, at 24,021 (emphasis added).
150. This is in contrast to the function and purpose of accounting "standards," which
will remain within the purview of the FASB. This proposal, however, envisions the
FASB's return to a more traditional concept of "standards" as enunciated by Professors
William A. Paton and A.C. Littleton in their classic work:
Standards should deal more with fundamental conceptions and general ap-
proaches to the presentation of accounting facts than with questions of precise
captions, degrees of subdivision, and detailed methods of estimating . . ..
. . . It should be possible to state accounting standards in such a way that
they will be useful guides to procedures over a wide area of application. Whereas
rules would be made to afford a basis for conformity, standards are conceived as
gauges by which to measure departures, when and if departure is necessary and
clearly justifiable. Standards, therefore, should not prescribe procedures or rig-
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would not be bound to follow earlier decisions, although doing so
certainly would not be inappropriate. Third, the emphasis would
be on speedy resolution of accounting problems as they arose.
Turnaround time would be measured in days or weeks, not
months or years.1"1 The Financial Accounting Standards Board
would continue to operate as it presently does; the Inquiry Cen-
ters would, of course, be expected to honor all present and fu-
ture FASB releases.
152
The Inquiry Centers would be organized regionally, perhaps
by state. Each Center would consist of both part-time and full-
time members appointed by the state accounting association.
Representation might also be mandated from a variety of other
constituencies: the SEC; the banking industry; academia; and
the investment-research profession. 53 The relative amount of
auditing activity occurring within a region would determine the
size of- each Center. Each Center would further divide its man-
power into operational teams of approximately four to five mem-
bers who would be assigned specific issues as submitted. Operat-
ing funds could be provided by a combination of special
accounting association dues and through an appropriate filing
fee schedule. 54 Ideally, these resources would be sufficient to
permit the Centers to offer salaries that would attract the high-
est caliber of professional talent. Members would be expected to
serve for two-year terms. 5
idly confine practices; rather standards should serve as guideposts to the best in
accounting reports.
W. PATON & A. LITTLETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE AccOUNTING STANDARDS 5-6
(1940).
151. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
152. The burden on the FASB would be lessened, of course. Presumably, it would no
longer feel the need to enunciate "standards" at the rate it has in the past. See supra
note 150 and accompanying text.
153. Although not crucial to the success of the program, such diversity in member-
ship ideally would make the Centers' rulings both better informed and more responsive
to user needs.
154. This method of financing was thought preferable to a system where major ac-
counting firms and corporations make sizeable contributions, an approach that has at
times brought criticism on the FASB. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 2, 3 (introduc-
tory remarks by Rep. John D. Dingell, presiding).
155. For comparison, each of the five members of the FASB serves for five years,
although some may be reappointed to a second five-year term. Id. at 178 (testimony of
Donald J. Kirk). Two years is short enough to attract those with concerns over the ex-
tent of their commitment and is, at the same time, long enough to enable members to
become familiar with the Center's internal procedures and to have a significant input
into a wide range of accounting issues.
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D. Advantages of the Plan
A number of significant advantages would be achieved under
this proposal. First, as a fact-specific process, the plan avoids the
legalistic and formalistic problems of general pronouncements.
15
6
The Centers would be free, within existing FASB releases, to
concentrate on the most economically accurate portrayal of the
financial situation at hand.1 57 The plan provides a much more
flexible arrangement than the current system. s8
Second, the proposed system would make use of and en-
courage interfirm and interdisciplinary consultation.159 Difficult
judgmental decisions would no longer rest on the shoulders of
one accountant or one accounting firm.6 0 The Inquiry Centers
would permit the use of a broad range of experience and talent
in their deliberations."6' In addition, the teams would be com-
fortably removed from the day-to-day pressures of the fypical
practitioner, including client-retention concerns, and would be
156. See Newman, supra note 68, at 82 (attributing the current legalistic approach
towards GAAP to "all the financial accounting rules that have been promulgated," so
that the temptation is to select the most favorable treatment "and ignore the economic
substance of the matter"); see also supra note 142 and accompanying text.
157. This result comports more closely with the FASB's own declaration that "deci-
sion usefulness" is the most important qualitative characteristic of accounting informa-
tion. See Stanger & Gunther, supra note 1, at 1214 (citing QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS
OF AccoUNTING INFORMATION, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, §§ 32-
110, 133-144 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1980)).
158. Indeed, even Donald J. Kirk, Chairman of the FASB, implicitly acknowledges
this need for flexibility:
The problems [that FASB] is asked to deal with generally are those on which
reasonable and informed people differ.
* * * [Iln making decisions, the Board must weigh conflicting factors, such as
having too many versus too few standards, or broad versus detailed standards.
Apart from self interest, reasonable people may differ as to how that balance
should be struck.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 179-80.
The FASB itself reiterated this comment in a statement to the Congressional Commit-
tee: "However, sometimes significant operational and environmental differences among
companies in different industries, among companies within a particular industry, or even
within a single company make different accounting appropriate in order to reflect the
substance of different circumstances." Id. at 214.
159. A task force created by the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA identified a
general belief among accountants that "there needs to be more consultation within firms
and more communication between them on accounting and auditing matters." Pearlman,
supra note 43, at 85. As another author put it, "It is desirable to permit maximum con-
sultation because business transactions are sometimes extremely complex, and such
transactions frequently also lead to accounting problems." Newman, supra note 68, at
82.
160. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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able to devote their full attention to the problem at hand. 162
Perhaps even more significant, however, is the potential for im-
proved communication between the preparers of financial infor-
mation and the users of that information. " This ultimately
should result in more useful and valuable information.
Third, this approach would highlight the types of accounting
issues being raised in practice. 6 4 Not only would this assist the
FASB in directing its attention to problem areas, but it would
also engender appropriate discussion in the profession's semi-
nars and scholarly literature. 6 '
Finally, this proposal retains the emphasis on self-regulation
that the profession so highly values. 6 Although the SEC would
have ultimate responsibility for the Centers, it would undoubt-
edly work with the profession in implementing the system. Pub-
lic accountants would, moreover, certainly have substantial rep-
resentation in the membership of these Centers. This proposal
also preserves the important roles of the FASB and the POB.
162. Because the teams would consist of a significant number of non-accountants,
they would be less susceptible to the threat of an individual accountant abusing his posi-
tion on a team to approve an accounting approach that will benefit his clients when he
returns to private practice.
163. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
164. This proposal would probably make redundant some of the activities of FASB's
Emerging Issues Task Force. The role of the EITF would have to be either modified or
perhaps eliminated under this proposal.
165. "As with any body of knowledge which is continuously evolving, e.g., medicine,
law, economics, there should be an active, continuous dialectic process involving the
groves of academe and practice. A free and open dialogue should be encouraged." Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 164 (statement of Abraham J. Briloff).
166. Professor Robert K. Mautz articulated the benefits of accountant self-regulation
as follows:
Generally, self-regulation is perceived as more equitable than public regulation
because the standards to be met are established and enforced by fellow practi-
tioners whose experience provides an understanding of the environment, the
risks, the pressures and the possibilities of service that laymen neither compre-
hend nor understand. Self-regulation, if performed properly, also assures better
service to the public because its emphasis is on remedy and improvement and
because it is in closer touch with practice, more aware of changing needs, and
more responsive to the wants of those who use the service than any other form
of regulation can be.
Mautz, Self-Regulation-Perils and Problems, J. AccT., May 1983, at 76, 78; see also
Hearings, supra note 3, at 798 (statement of Eli Mason, Chairman of the National Con-
ference of CPA Practitioners, identifying three reasons for retaining the standard-setting
process in the private sector).
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E. Criticisms of the Plan
This proposal is bound to encounter a number of criticisms.
One potential problem is that accountants, or their clients,
might be reluctant to submit issues to the Center for fear of an
adverse ruling.167 Where an accounting treatment is at all likely
to be controversial, however, the accountant may be assuming a
considerable professional liability risk for failing to submit the
question to the Center for its approval."" This alone should pro-
vide sufficient incentive. If not, then it may be desirable to im-
pose civil liability by statute on both the auditor and the client
firm for failing to submit issues that, according to their peers in
the profession, clearly ought to have been submitted. Account-
ants will realize that they can no longer hide behind the cloak of
professional judgment.169 Here the SEC, perhaps through an en-
tity such as the POB, would play a key supervisory and investi-
gative role.
A second criticism might be that auditors will submit too
many issues, simply overburdening the system. A number of re-
sponses can be made. First, the filing fee should be substantial
enough to discourage frivolous filings. Second, the Center may,
in its discretion, simply refuse to hear certain requests in the
same way that other jurisdictional bodies decline to hear certain
cases. The individual auditor would then be free to apply her
own best judgment to the situation. But third, and perhaps most
persuasively, over time there should be enough rulings on the
record to provide accountants with sufficient guidance so that
they often would not need to submit an inquiry themselves.
170
This should help reduce the caseload appreciably as the plan
matures.
A third criticism may be that different Centers could give dif-
ferent opinions to similar factual situations.1 7 1 Decisions issued
by one Center, however, will presumably be read by the others;
where conflicts still exist, scholarly critique should highlight
these conflicts and bring appropriate discussion to bear on
167. The rulings would be binding in each individual case.
168. The accountant may be opening himself to a tort action for the negligent failure
to exercise due care or proper professional responsibility.
169. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
170. Even if the actual volume of inquiries does not subside, the efficiency of the
Centers themselves should improve as the resolution of more and more issues are expe-
dited by reference to previous rulings.
171. This problem is a possibility in our judicial system as well.
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them.172 Perhaps this conflict and discussion will prompt the
FASB to take appropriate action. On the other hand, differing
approaches by separate Centers might be beneficial."' By per-
mitting alternative accounting treatments, the profession is, in a
sense, conducting a form of laboratory experiment. After the
passage of time, the profession can stand back and, on the basis
of experience, select the approach it finds most appropriate. It
may, in fact, find that both approaches were valid after all.
1" 4
Finally, some will assert that this proposal creates an expen-
sive, bureaucratic nightmare. While it is true that this system
will add costs to the overall auditing process, such costs need not
be prohibitive. For one thing, the profession would self-adminis-
ter the plan. Unlike some government programs, there is no in-
centive on the part of the Center members to build empires.
Presumably, the profession has some self-interest in keeping
these costs to a reasonable level. Second, one must always view
the cost of something in light of the value received. Truly useful
information is rarely a free commodity. When one adds the
value represented by increased investor confidence in financial
information, the costs of the Inquiry Center proposal seem mea-
ger indeed.
CONCLUSION
This Note demonstrates how the recent increase in auditor
changes is symptomatic of the larger problem of pressure on au-
ditor independence. In a competitive environment for audit ser-
vices, where auditors can be replaced virtually on the whim of
the client, the auditor today inevitably feels some compulsion to
apply accounting standards in such a way as to keep the paying
client satisfied. To the extent that accountants succumb to these
pressures, financial information is less reliable than it otherwise
could be. But even where the profession has been able to with-
stand this sort of client pressure, the appearance of indepen-
172. It may be necessary to live with conflicting interpretations for a while. This
often occurs under the present system. See, e.g., supra note 141 and accompanying text.
173. But see Hearings, supra note 3, at 386 (FASB Response to Written Questions)
(indicating that in 1976 the Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting, and Manage-
ment issued a report that severely criticized the FASB for tolerating the existence of up
to 42 different "alternative accounting methods").
174. Note that this clearly has not been the approach taken by the FASB. See id. at
214-17 (statement of the FASB regarding the Comparability of Accounting Information);
id. at 386 (statement of the FASB identifying the very few remaining areas where any
alternative accounting methods exist).
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dence in the eyes of the investing public may have been tar-
nished. When this occurs, investors and other financial
statement users price-protect themselves, and financial markets
are damaged irrespective of the true quality of the underlying
information.
The best solution is to separate the client-retention aspect
from the underlying accounting-treatment issue. This Note has
proposed the creation of regional Accounting Issue Inquiry Cen-
ters to render prompt, fact-specific opinions on the legitimacy of
various accounting treatments. The responsibility for choice of
treatment on close issues would belong to the Center, not the
auditor. Where the Center rejects a particular treatment, the au-
ditor need not fear being replaced; the proposed treatment
would be improper regardless of who rendered the opinion.
Upon approval of a treatment, the auditor would be able to
render an unqualified opinion without fear of liability-and with
a much clearer conscience than he otherwise might have had.
Overall, society would win through the establishment of a more
efficient information market. Difficult accounting issues would
be brought into the open, and investors would have the assur-
ance of knowing that issues had been resolved by experts free
from the biased self-interest that a client's fee might have
imposed.
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